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POSTHUMOUS RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT AND A PROPOSAL
FOR SOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity, a term of art first coined by Judge Je-
rome Frank in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.," is used to refer to the right of a person to exploit his own
name and likeness. It has been characterized both as a personal
property right' and as a right of value.8 While a right of publicity
has no inherent value, it becomes "valuable" when a celebrity" or his
assign exploits the right by selling a product or service bearing the
celebrity's name or likeness for profit. Whether the right of publicity
is viewed as a property right or a right of value, the commercial
exploitation of this right by a celebrity, athlete, writer or public fig-
ure can involve substantial sums of money.
The right of publicity is a creature of state law' and has been
codified by statute in California and New York.' Though a living
person may prevent the appropriation of his own name and likeness
by another,7 not all jurisdictions recognize a cause of action brought
O 1984 by Leslie Kane
1. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
2. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981);
Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979), the California Supreme Court stated, "the parties have extensively briefed and argued,
that the interest in question is one of 'property' . . . . We agree, however, with Dean Prosser
who considers a dispute over this question 'pointless' [citation omitted]. Once protected by the
law [the right of a person to the use of his name and likeness] . . . is a right of value . .. ."
25 Cal. 3d at 818-19, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (quoting W. PRossEsR, LAW OF
TownS 807 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added by the court).
4. In this comment the term celebrity will be used in a generic sense to refer to movie
and television personalities, professional athletes, musicians, actors, entertainers, public figures,
and the like.
5. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
6. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
7. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
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by the heirs or assigns of a famous ancestor to enjoin posthumous
commercial exploitation by a third party who sells merchandise
bearing the deceased celebrity's name and likeness.
This lack of uniformity among the jurisdictions regarding the
posthumous right of publicity poses a number of intriguing ques-
tions. For example, do the laws of the state in which the deceased
celebrity gained his fame and entered into merchandise licensing
contracts govern the posthumous right of publicity? Or do the laws
of the state where the harm occurred-the state in which the defen-
dant merchandiser realized his greatest profits-govern? Whose law
governs when the defendant merchandiser profits by exploiting a de-
ceased celebrity's name and likeness in several states, some of which
recognize the posthumous right of publicity, and some of which do
not? Most importantly, does an injunction against a defendant mer-
chandiser's commercial exploitation of a celebrity's right of publicity
in one state prohibit the merchandiser from operating the same busi-
ness in a jurisdiction that does not recognize a posthumous right of
publicity? These questions have not yet been resolved.
This comment reviews the jurisdictional split over the posthu-
mous right of publicity, and focuses on California, New York, New
Jersey, Tennessee and Georgia law, as these are the only jurisdic-
tions in which posthumous right of publicity cases have been re-
ported. It will analyze the questions posed and the conflict which
arises in the interstate commercial exploitation of the posthumous
right of publicity. Finally, the comment proposes that a uniform na-
tional act permitting a posthumous right of publicity where there has
been an inter vivos assignment or devise evidenced by significant
commercial exploitation be adopted.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Origins
The right of publicity originated in privacy law and is one of
four distinct torts which protects the plaintiff's right "to be left
alone." 8 In their famous Harvard Law Review article, Warren and
Brandeis advocated that the law recognize a person's right to be left
alone and called this a "right of privacy."' Dean Prosser later named
the four privacy torts: intrusion, public disclosure of private facts,
8. The words "to be left alone" were first used in T. COOLEY, LAW OF TOMTS 29 (2d
ed. 1888).
9. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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false light publicity and "[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advan-
tage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness."" Appropriation is now
commonly referred to as the right of publicity.
B. The Right of Publicity: Living Persons v. Decedents
As early as 1905, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.," the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a living person's right
of publicity using a privacy analysis. In Pavesich the plaintiff's pho-
tograph was used by defendant life insurance company in an adver-
tisement. The court held that this violation of the plaintiff's privacy
entitled him to recover damages." Similarly, in Haelen Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 3 a baseball player success-
fully enjoined a chewing gum company from using his photograph as
a means of promoting the sale of defendant's gum and recovered
damages under what the court called "a right of publicity."' 4
The United States Supreme Court held, in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.,' 5 that petitioner, a celebrity who per-
formed a "human cannonball" act at county fairs, had a protectable
right of publicity. In Zacchini defendant broadcaster filmed the peti-
tioner's entire 15-second human cannonball act and broadcasted, on
a television news program, the act in its entirety. Zacchini brought
suit for damages alleging unlawful appropriation of his professional
property." The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that he
had a right of publicity giving him "personal control" over commer-
cial exploitation of his act, but held that the press was privileged to
broadcast the performance.17 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed.' 8 The Court reasoned that Zacchini had economic value in
his performance and the unauthorized use of the film affected his
ability to earn a living as an entertainer. The Court concluded that,
"[p]etitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance;
he simply wants to be paid for it."' 9 The Zacchini analysis relied on
the strictly personal right the petitioner had in his performance. No-
10. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
11. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
12. Id.
13. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
14. 202 F.2d at 868.
15. 433 U.S. 562.
16. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E. 2d 454
(1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
17. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 235, 351 N.E. 2d at 461.
18. 433 U.S. at 579.
19. Id. at 578.
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where in the decision is there a suggestion that anyone other than
Zacchini himself had the right to exploit, for commercial purposes,
his name and likeness.
A decedent's right of publicity, and by extension, the right of his
heirs to enforce this right, however, is in doubt. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc.,'0 held
that under Illinois law the right of privacy could not be asserted by
anyone other than the person whose privacy is invaded. In Maritote,
the administratrix of Al Capone's estate sued the television produc-
tion company of the "The Untouchables" series for unjust enrich-
ment in appropriating the name, likeness, and personality of the no-
torious gangster. Capone's widow and son brought a claim for
invasion of privacy. The court observed that defendant's " 'commer-
cial exploitation' of decedent in commercially televised fictional
broadcasts after his death" gave rise to both claims, and that both
claims constituted an invasion of privacy.'" However, plaintiffs were
denied relief because the court reasoned that "[iut is anomalous to
speak of the privacy of a deceased person."'
C. Statutes Recognizing A Right Of Publicity
California and New York have statutory provisions which pro-
tect the right of publicity in living persons. In the New York statute,
entitled Right of Privacy,"" it is a misdemeanor to use the name or
likeness of "any living person" for advertising or trade, without the
written consent of that person. It is clear that this statute creates no
right in a person's descendants or heirs to enjoin the use of an ances-
tor's name or likeness.
California's statutory right of publicity is found in section 3344
of the Civil Code"4 and is similar to the New York statute. The
20. 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 383 (1965).
21. 345 F.2d at 418-19.
22. Id. at 419, 420.
23. The New York statute provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the pur-
poses of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her
parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976).
24. Section 3344 states:
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph, or likeness, in
any manner, for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods or ser-
vices, or for purposes of solicitation of purchases of products, merchandise,
goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor,
the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages
[Vol. 24
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statute, which is designated "use of name or photograph without
consent for advertising," does not specifically use the term "living
person" but -its language leaves no doubt that only a living person
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in
any action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall
be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount no less than three hundred
dollars ($300).
(b) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph or photo-
graphic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live television trans-
mission, of any person, such that the person is readily identifiable.(l) A person
shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph when one who
views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine that the
person depicted in the photograph is the same person who is complaining of its
unauthorized use.
(2) If the photograph includes more than one person so identifiable, then the
person or persons complaining of the use shall be represented as individuals
rather than solely as members of a definable group represented in the photo-
graph. A definable group includes, but is not limited to, the following examples:
a crowd at any sporting event, a crowd in any street or public building, the
audience at any theatrical or stage production, a glee club, or a baseball team.
(3) A person or persons shall be considered to be represented as members of a
definable group if they are represented in the photograph solely as a result of
being present at the time the photograph was taken and have not been singled
out as individuals in any manner.
(c) Where a photograph or likeness of an employee of the person using the
photograph or likeness appearing in the advertisement or other publication pre-
pared by or in behalf of the user is only incidental, and not essential, to the
purpose of the publication in which it appears, there shall arise a rebuttable
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that the failure to ob-
tain the consent of the employee was not a knowing use of the employee's pho-
tograph or likeness.
(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, photograph or likeness in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any
political campaign, shall not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or
solicitation.
(e) The use of a name, photograph or likeness in a commercial medium shall
not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or solicitation solely because the
material containing such use is commercially sponsored or contains paid adver-
tising. Rather it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the com-
plainant's name, photograph or likeness was so directly connected with the com-
mercial sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for
purposes of advertising or solicitation.
(f) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees of any me-
dium used for advertising, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines,
radio and television stations, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any advertise-
ment or solicitation in violation of this section is published or disseminated, un-
less it is established that such owners or employees had knowledge of the unau-
thorized use of the person's name, photograph, or likeness as prohibited by this
section.
(g) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall be in
addition to any others provided for by law.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1972).
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can bring this cause of action. Neither the California nor the New
York statute creates a posthumous right of publicity in the heirs or
assigns of a deceased celebrity.
D. Restatement View
Appropriation of name or likeness is recognized as a tort in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 ' The right protected is the "interest
of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity" which is
considered to be "in the nature of" a property right. The right of
publicity is exercised or exploited during life when a person grants
an exclusive license or assigns his publicity rights to a third party,
who sells merchandise bearing his name and likeness. The third
party who is the assignee of a person's right of publicity, may bring
suit to protect the license or assignment.2
The Restatement does not recognize a posthumous right of pub-
licity in a decedent's heirs. At most, it recognizes an inter vivos as-
signment to a third party who will have standing to protect his li-
cense. An inter vivos assignment, it may be argued, will create a
posthumous right of publicity in the assignee for the particular pho-
tograph or particular item of merchandise that is the subject of the
assignee's license.27 The Restatement does not contemplate the
wholesale assignment or devise of a "generic" right of publicity to
every likeness of the assignor for use with all products.
III. THE POSTHUMOUS RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: JURISDICTIONAL
CONFLICT
A living person may thus maintain a suit for infringement of his
right of publicity in New York and California, or by using the Re-
statement view for support in those jurisdictions where the legisla-
ture has yet to codify the right. However, the posthumous right of
publicity in the heirs of a celebrity is not a statutory right, and may
be sued upon only in those states which recognize the cause of ac-
tion. A review of recent case law demonstrates that heirs or assigns
may be able to enjoin a merchandiser's commercial exploitation of
25. "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652C (1977).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment a (1977).
27. For a detailed discussion of exploitation of particular commercial situations see, Lu-
gosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 818, 822, 603 P.2d 425, 428, 430, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 326, 328 (1979).
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their celebrity ancestor's name and likeness if the plaintiff is fortu-
nate enough to bring suit in a jurisdiction which recognizes a pos-
thumous right of publicity. So far, those jurisdictions are New York,
New Jersey and Georgia only.
A. The New York Cases
In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 8 Harmon Pictures, a Cal-
ifornia corporation, sued Hal Roach Studios, a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in New York, for appropria-
tion of the world-wide, exclusive merchandising rights to the names
and likenesses of the Laurel and Hardy comedy team. Harmon was
joined in the suit by the widows and beneficiaries of the two comedi-
ans. Harmon had been party to an agreement between the comedian
Stanley. Laurel, Hardy's widow, Price, and the Laurel and Hardy
production company, a California corporation, which granted Har-
mon "in perpetuity the exclusive right to utilize and merchandise"
Laurel and Hardy's publicity rights. Defendant Roach Studios
claimed to own copyrights to certain Laurel and Hardy movies, and
had entered into an agreement purporting to convey merchandising
rights to the names and likenesses of the comedians.29
Despite the numerous California contacts, the case was decided
on the basis of New York law.30 The court found for the plaintiffs
and held that there was no requirement that a person exercise his
right of publicity in order to protect it from posthumous exploitation
or to perserve the right for his heirs."' It relied on Haelen Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 3 a case that considered a
living celebrity's right of publicity, to find that the right of publicity
is an assignable property right that does not terminate on death."'
It is difficult to understand how the court could conclude that a
right of publicity, which had never been exploited during life, de-
scends to one's heirs. The court reasoned that the New York statute
protecting a person from commercial exploitation supported its hold-
ing that lifetime exploitation is unnecessary."4 However, the New
York statute protects the "living," and the person who is wronged
must bring suit to protect his right. A decedent, obviously, cannot
28. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. Id. at 838.
30. Id. at 843.
31. Id. at 846.
32. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
33. 400 F. Supp. at 844.
34. Id. at 846.
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protect his own right, and neither the New York statute nor the Re-
statement creates a descendible publicity right or a posthumous pub-
licity right in all likenesses of decedent or in every merchandising
opportunity, whether or not exploited.
In contrast to the decision in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, two
later New York cases were decided in favor of defendants who had
exploited deceased celebrities' rights of publicity. Both Frosch v.
Grosset & Dunlop, Inc.35 and Hicks v. Casablanca Records 6 relied
on the traditional protections afforded to freedom of expression and
carefully avoided the fact that the profit motive was responsible for
defendants' literary and filmmaking endeavors.
Frosch and Hicks are anomalies in the line of decisions based on
New York law. Though books and movies enjoy certain constitu-
tional protections not generally accorded merchandise,"' they are
nonetheless profit-making endeavors and as such should be suscepti-
ble to injunction, under New York law, by heirs and assigns of a
deceased celebrity. Frosch and Hicks raise the question of whether a
posthumous right of publicity extends only to a commercial adver-
tisement for the sale of goods or services such as posters, tee-shirts
and bubblegum cards, but fails in the face of other commercial and
profit-making ventures such as books and movies.
Most recently, in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and
Night Co.," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
question of which state's law should govern in a right of publicity
case. In the lower court the Marx Brothers' heirs, who claimed to
own the publicity rights of comedians Groucho, Chico and Harpo
Marx, sought a licensing fee in connection with the Broadway play
"A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine." The play featured
performers who "reproduce[d] the appearance and comedy style
made memorable by Groucho, Chico and Harpo." 9 The court
35. 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980). In Frosch, plaintiff-executor of the estate
of actress Marilyn Monroe sued defendant publisher and author Norman Mailer for infringe-
ment of Monroe's right of publicity in connection with the publication of the book MARILYN.
The court held that freedom of expression outweighed the right of publicity of the decedent.
36. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Hicks, plaintiff heir and assignee of the pub-
licity rights of mystery author Agatha Christie sought to enjoin defendants, filmmaker Casa-
blanca and publisher Ballentine books, from showing the motion picture and distributing the
book AGATHA, both of which concerned a fictional event in the life of the late writer. The
court held that Christie's right of publicity had been properly assigned and survived her death,
but held that the balance between freedom of expression and protection of the right of public-
ity militated in favor of freedom of expression. Id. at 430, 433.
37. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 430.
38. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 319.
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granted partial summary judgment for the heirs, ruling that the
Marx brothers' performances as themselves were sufficient lifetime
exploitation and therefore it was unnecessary for the comedians to
"endorse dance studios, candy bars or tee-shirts.""' The court con-
cluded that any literary merit in the play was outweighed by the
"wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters" and re-
jected defendants' contention that freedom of expression protected
their rights to produce the play without paying damages to the
plaintiffs. 1
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the "deci-
sion to look to the law of New York [to decide the case] was incor-
rect."' 2 The court stated that in deciding a right of publicity case, a
New York court "would apply its property choice-of-law rules to
select the state whose law" governs a posthumous right of publicity
claim.' Thus, even though plaintiff's harm occurred in New York,
California law governed because, among other things, the comedians
were California residents at the time of their deaths, the Marx
Brothers' production company executed various contracts assigning
publicity rights which were governed by California law, and plaintiff
Susan Marx was a California resident."
The court relied on Lugosi v. Universal Pictures" as establish-
ing that California law did not recognize a posthumous right of pub-
licity in the heirs of a celebrity who did not exploit his own right
during his lifetime.' Thus, no posthumous right of publicity existed
in the heirs of the Marx Brothers, and the producers of the Broad-
way play were not liable for a royalty or licensing fee.
B. The California Case
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures4' is a landmark case in the area of
40. Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
41. Id. at 493.
42. 689 F.2d at 319.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 320.
45. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
46. 689 F.2d at 321-23. Judge Newman concluded, however, that Lugosi was subject to
a second interpretation, namely that California recognizes a posthumous right of publicity
"only in connection with particular commercial situations-product and services-that a celeb-
rity promoted during his lifetime." Under either interpretation, the court stated, the plaintiffs
in Groucho could not prevail because California law would not recognize a posthumous right
of publicity "that protects against an original play using a celebrity's likeness and comedic
style." Id. at 323.
47. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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posthumous right of publicity. The actor, Bela Lugosi, contracted
with Universal Pictures to play the title role in the film "Dracula."
The contract gave Univeral the exclusive right to exploit the actor's
name and likeness in connection with the film. Lugosi's widow and
son filed suit alleging that Universal had appropriated property they
had inherited from Lugosi by entering into licensing agreements
which authorized the licensees to commercially exploit the character
of Dracula. 8 The trial court found that Lugosi had a protectable
property right in his likeness and appearance as Count Dracula
which descended to his heirs."' The Court of Appeal reversed and
the California Supreme Court affirmed, adopting as its own the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal.50
The California Supreme Court reasoned that the dispute over
whether the right of publicity was a property right was "pointless,"
and called it instead a "right of value" which Lugosi had neither
exploited nor protected during his lifetime. The court held that the
right of publicity "is embraced in the law of privacy and is protect-
able during one's lifetime but it does not survive the death of Lu-
gosi. '" The court found support for its decision in privacy law,
which unequivocally states that the right of privacy dies with the
individual who can enforce his personal right. Just as privacy is a
personal right, "[tlhe very decision to exploit name and likeness is a
personal one." 5'
The Lugosi decision makes it clear that the "opportunity" to
exploit a famous ancestor's right of publicity does not descend to the
celebrity's heirs regardless of whether the celebrity exploited the
right during his lifetime. "Assertions by the heirs of the right to ex-
ploit their predecessor's name and likeness to commercial situations
he left unexploited simply is not the exercise of that right by the
person entitled to it."63
There is no question that Lugosi governs posthumous publicity
rights in California. Two days after Lugosi was decided, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court cited it as authority in holding that no posthu-
mous publicity rights existed in the heirs of silent movie actor Ru-
dolph Valentino.54 Thus, in California, there is no posthumous right
48. Id. at 816-817, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
49. Id. at 817, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
50. Id. at 816, 603 P.2d at 426, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
51. Id. at 818.19, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
52. Id. at 821-22, 603 P.2d at 429-430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
53. Id. at 823, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis in original).





In Martin Luther King, Jr. v. American Heritage Products,55
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions regarding
the right of publicity to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court of
Appeals asked if Georgia law recognized a distinct right of publicity,
whether this right survived the death of its owner, and as such was
inheritable and devisable, and whether the owner needed to commer-
cially exploit the publicity right during life to insure a posthumous
right vested in the owner's heirs."
In King defendant James E. Bolen developed the idea of mar-
keting a plastic bust of Dr. King and formed defendant company,
American Heritage Products, to manufacture the bust. Bolen sought
the endorsement and participation of plaintiff Martin Luther King,
Jr. Center for Social Change in the endeavor, but the Center re-
fused. Bolen advertised the bust in Ebony magazine and in newspa-
pers nationwide. Plaintiffs Coretta Scott King, Dr. King's widow,
the Center for Social Change, and Motown Records, the assignee of
the rights to some of Dr. King's copyrighted speeches, brought suit
to enjoin Bolen's business activities. The federal district court held
for the plaintiffs and defendant's appeal on the right of publicity
issues resulted in the certification of questions to the Georgia Su-
preme Court."
The Georgia Supreme Court held that appropriation of a per-
son's right of publicity was a tort in Georgia whether "the person
whose name and likeness is used is a private citizen, entertainer, or
a public figure who is not a public official."s" The court also
held that the right of publicity is inheritable and assignable, and that
a person need not exercise his publicity right during life to assure
the survival of the right in his heirs." Thus, Georgia appears to
follow New York law.
Rptr. 352 (1979), the heirs of silent film star Rudolph Valentino sued defendant Spelling-
Goldberg who exhibited a fictional account of Valentino's life on television, without obtaining
the consent of the heirs. The heirs sought injunctive relief and damages on a right of publicity
theory. The court held that Lugosi controlled the disposition of the case and denied relief to
plaintiffs. Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
55. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 674.
57. Id. at 675-76.
58. 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1982).
59. Id. at, 296 S.E.2d at 705-06.
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D. The Elvis Presley Cases
More than any other group of cases, the Elvis Presley decisions
illustrate the difficulties that arise when a celebrity's posthumous
publicity rights in his heirs or assigns are determined by reference to
the law of more than one jurisdiction. Since 1978, six Presley cases
have been decided by the federal courts whose rulings were based on
the law of three different states.
1. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.60 (Factors I)
In Factors I, defendant Pro Arts, an Ohio corporation, pur-
chased a photograph of the entertainer Elvis Presley from a staff
photographer on the Atlanta Journal and produced a poster from
that photograph. The poster bore the legend "In Memory" and the
dates "1935-1977." Pro Arts informed plaintiff Factors, the exclu-
sive licensee of Boxcar Enterprises, a Tennessee corporation con-
trolled by Presley and his business associate Colonel Tom Parker,
that it was distributing the Elvis poster to meet the public demand
for memorabilia after the celebrity's death. The poster was distrib-
uted by co-defendant Stop and Shop Stores through its retail outlets
in New York. Factors replied that it owned the exclusive right to
Presley's name and likeness in connection with the sale and distribu-
tion of all merchandise, and threatened legal action if poster sales
were not immediately discontinued. 1
Rather than cease distribution, Pro Arts filed suit in the North-
ern District of Ohio for declaratory relief. Factors, upon learning it
had been sued, instituted an action in the Southern District of New
York and obtained a preliminary injunction against Pro Arts. Pro
Arts perfected an interlocutory appeal."' The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected Pro Arts' claims that the case should have been
transferred to Ohio or stayed, pending the outcome of the Ohio ac-
tion, and proceeded to the right of publicity claims."
The Court of Appeals found that New York law governed the
duration of Presley's right of publicity and held that Boxcar's exclu-
sive right to exploit Presley's right of publicity, because exercised
during life, survived the celebrity's death. Thus the right had been
validly transferred to plaintiff Factors."
60. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
61. 579 F.2d at 217.
62. Id. at 217-18.
63. Id. at 218-19.
64. Id. at 220-22. Relying on Haelen Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), the court reasoned that Presley had a property right in his name and
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The Factors I decision follows the precedent set in New York
by Price v. Hal Roach Studios.s Elvis Presley, like Laurel and
Hardy in Price, had a property right in his name and likeness which
survived his death. Presley had exercised his right of publicity dur-
ing life by licensing Factors to commercially exploit his name and
likeness through the sale of "Elvis merchandise." This commercial
exploitation guaranteed that under New York law, Presley's assigns
owned the celebrity's exclusive publicity rights posthumously.
2. Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc."
In Memphis Development the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reached the opposite conclusion of the Second Circuit in Factors L
The Memphis Development Foundation, a non-profit Tennessee
corporation, planned to erect a statue of Elvis Presley in downtown
Memphis. The Foundation solicited public funds to pay for the
sculpture, offering an eight-inch replica of the statue to contributors
to the project. Factors brought suit, as it had in Factors I, to enjoin
the Foundation from distributing the replica statue.67
The sixth circuit held that the right of publicity was not inher-
itable and that it "should not be given the status of a devisable right,
even where as here a person exploits the right by contract during
life."" Thus, despite the exclusive license which Factor's held to
Presley's right of publicity, the court held that under Tennessee law
the right did not survive the celebrity's death and "the opportunity
for gain shift[ed] to the public domain, where it is equally open to
all." '" The court based its decision on practical and policy grounds.
The court reasoned that fame is simply a by-product of a strong
personal motivation to create and achieve success in a particular field
whereas the desire to exploit fame for the economic advantage of
descendants is pale in comparison to the personal motivation for
achievement. The court stated:
[Fame] usually depends on the communication of information
about the famous person by the media. The intangible and
likeness which was transferable and survived the celebrity's death. "To hold that the right did
not survive Presley's death, would be to grant competitors of Factors, such as Pro Arts, a
windfall in the form of profits from the use of Presley's name and likeness . . . [and] the
exclusive right purchased by Factors. . . would be rendered virtually worthless." 579 F.2d at
211.
65. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
66. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
67. 616 F.2d at 957.
68. Id. at 958.
69. Id. at 957.
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shifting nature of fame and celebrity status, the presence of
widespread public and press participation in its creation, the
unusual psychic rewards and income that often flow from it
during life and the fact that it may be created by bad as well as
good conduct combine to create serious reservations about mak-
ing fame the permanent right of a few individuals to the exclu-
sion of the general public.7
The court also addressed the practical problems that arise when
a posthumous right of publicity is recognized. It raised, but left un-
answered, such questions as how long the posthumous right should
last, whether it was taxable, whether it interfered with First Amend-
ment rights, whether it extended to public officials and public figures
as well as to celebrities, and whether the type of product on which a
posthumous right of publicity was exploited would make a difference
in a court's decision to recognize the right."1
The economic policy considerations in Memphis Development
are a significant departure from the other posthumous right of pub-
licity cases. The court reasoned that fairness and efficiency militated
in favor of the right of publicity being "regarded as a common asset
to be shared, an economic opportunity available in the free market
system." 7'
3. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.7" (Factors HI)
Factors brought suit for a third time to protect its license. In
Factors II, Factors moved for summary judgment on the merits after
it had obtained a preliminary injunction against Pro Arts in Factors
I, and after Memphis Development had been decided. Pro Arts as-
serted that Memphis Development collaterally estopped Factors from
asserting it owned Presley's posthumous right of publicity. The dis-
trict court rejected Pro Arts' contention and granted a permanent
injunction from which Pro Arts appealed. 4 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed, stating that a New York court would look
to the law of Tennessee in resolving the dispute.7 The circuit court
stated that because Presley was domiciled in Tennessee and Factors
had contracted for its license there, and because the contract provided
70. Id. at 959.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 960.
73. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
74. 456 U.S. at 280.
75. Id. The court noted that in Factors I the parties did not discuss choice of law rules,
and the Factors I court applied New York law "without discussion." Id. That choice of law
rule did not, however, preclude the present court from examining the point upon appeal. Id.
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it was to be construed in accordance with the laws of that state, Ten-
nessee law must govern."
In a well reasoned opinion, Judge Newman stated that were he
serving on the Tennessee Supreme Court, he would recognize a pos-
thumous right of publicity. However, the issue in this case was
whether the federal court decision in Memphis Development, which
interpreted the law of a state within its own circuit, should be re-
garded as an authoritative interpretation of that state's law by the
federal courts in other circuits. Judge Newman reasoned that the
second circuit should defer to the sixth circuit's ruling on the issue
unless there was clear indication that the sixth circuit's ruling had
been incorrect. Thus the court accepted Memphis Development as
controlling authority, and found that the licensor "had no right of
publicity in Presley's name and likeness to convey to Factors."7
4. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.7 '8 (Factors IlI)
In Factors III Pro Arts moved for summary judgment and an
assessment of damages against Factors on the basis of the second
circuit's decision in Factors II. Factors filed a cross motion for sum-
mary judgment citing Commerce Union Bank v. Coors7' in support
of its motion. In the alternative, Factors requested that the court stay
entry of judgment in Factors III so that it could petition the second
circuit to recall its mandate and rehear the case on the basis of the
decision rendered by the Tennessee Chancery Court in Commerce
Union Bank.80
In Commerce Union Bank the executor of the estate of Lester
Flatt, a bluegrass musician,' 1 brought suit against the defendant, a
distributor of Coors beer, for infringement of the celebrity's right of
publicity in connection with Coor's use of Flatt's image on an adver-
tising poster. Defendant Coors, who used Flatt's likeness along with
that of President Andrew Jackson on a sales poster, neither sought
permission from the estate to use Flatt's likeness, nor paid any royal-
ties to the estate for the use of Flatt's likeness.'
The court held that Flatt had a posthumous right of publicity,
76. Id. at 281.
77. Id. at 283.
78. 541 F. Supp. 231 (1982).
79. 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2204 (1981).
80. 541 F. Supp. at 233.
81. Flatt was best known for his collaboration with musician Earl Scruggs. Flatt and
Scruggs appeared on television together at the Grand Old Opry and composed the theme music
for the "Beverly Hillbillies" television program and the motion picture "Bonnie and Clyde."
82. 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2205.
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and noted that the right of publicity had not yet been recognized in
Tennessee. However, since other intangible property rights had re-
ceived recognition, the court stated that the Tennessee Supreme
Court would undoubtedly recognize the right of publicity "when
presented with an appropriate case."" The court relied on Sanford-
Day Iron-Works v. Enterprise Foundry & Machine," as support for
finding the right of publicity to be a descendible property right. The
court dismissed Memphis Development and Factors II as not binding
on its decision, and stated that consideration of fundamental fairness
and the public policy "to provide an incentive for enterprise and cre-
ativity by allowing individuals to benefit from their personal ef-
forts" 88 controlled the disposition of the case."
On the basis of Commerce Union Bank, the district court in
Factors III granted Factor's motion to stay entry of judgment.87 It
determined that the Commerce Union Bank decision was entitled to
proper regard even though it was a Tennessee Chancery Court deci-
sion which did not bind the federal courts. The court was persuaded
by the fact that both Memphis Development and Factors II were de-
cided in the absence of any Tennessee case to use as guidance and
granted the stay in light of the fact that the first Tennessee state
court case to address the issue held that a posthumous right of pub-
licity does exist."
5. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts" (Factors IV)
In Factors IV the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied Fac-
tors' petition for a rehearing to assess the decision by the Tennessee
Chancery Court in Commerce Union Bank. The Court of Appeals
stated that it was not necessary to decide whether Commerce Union
Bank was authoritative as against the sixth circuit's decision in
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.
The court relied on Lancaster v. Factors Etc., Inc.,90 another
83. Id.
84. 130 Tenn. 669, 172 S.W. 537 (1915). In Sanford-Day Ironworks, the court held
that the exclusive right to use a trade name can survive the termination of business by the
business entity which used it.
85. 7 MEDIA L. RES'. (BNA) at 2208 (quoting Fetcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of
the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1129
(1980)) [hereinafter cited as Fetcher & Rubin II].
86. 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2208.
87. 541 F. Supp. at 234.
88. Id.
89. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
90. 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1109 (1982).
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decision of the Tennessee Chancery Court rendered subsequent to
Commerce Union Bank, which held that no posthumous right of
publicity existed in Tennessee. The court concluded that the two
conflicting opinions on the posthumous right of publicity by the state
trial court gave the second circuit no basis for considering that Ten-
nessee law had changed since its decision in Factors 11."1
In the final analysis, though the Commerce Union Bank deci-
sion raises some uncertainty, Tennessee appears to follow the Cali-
fornia rule and does not recognize a posthumous right of publicity.
6. The New Jersey Case
In Estate of Presley v. Russen,92 the plaintiff estate alleged in-
fringement of Presley's right to publicity. It sought to enjoin exhibi-
tion of "The Big El Show," a live stage performance which repro-
duced an Elvis Presley concert, and the sale of merchandise in
connection with the show. Defendant Russen first produced the show
in 1975, two years before the entertainer's death, and had not been
authorized nor enjoined by Presley himself, nor by any Presley
licensee. s
The court stated that New Jersey law would allow a suit for
infringement of the right of publicity." Though the court never ad-
dressed the fact that neither Presley nor his licensees had sought to
enjoin "The Big El Show" while Presley was alive, it nevertheless
found that the celebrity had exploited his right of publicity during
his lifetime." The court held that "Elvis Presley's right of publicity
survived his death and became part of Presley's estate."" However,
the court did not enjoin the performance of "The Big El Show" be-
cause plaintiff estate had failed to show that the show's continuance
would result in "loss of commercial benefits" or "irreparable corn-
91. The court stated:
The Lancaster decision is surely entitled to no less weight than the decision in
Commerce Union Bank and may even have a special pertinence since it involves
a claim by the same parties who are plaintiffs in the instant litigation with
respect to a descendible right of publicity concerning Elvis Presley.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, 701 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1983).
92. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
93. Id. at 1349-50.
94. Id. at 1344.
95. Id. at 1345.
96. Id. In footnote 10 the court stated, "we 'need not, and therefore do not, decide
whether the right would survive the death of the celebrity if not exploited during the celebrity's
life' since Presley exercised the right to commercially exploit his name and likeness during his
life" (quoting Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 n. II (2d Cir. 1978)).
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mercial harm in the near future."" The court stated:
The plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that the existence
of defendant's activity has lead to or is likely to lead to a dimin-
ished ability of the plaintiff to profit from the use of Elvis Pres-
ley's name or likeness. . . . As a matter of fact, it is even possi-
ble that defendant's production has stimulated the public's
interest in buying Elvis Presley merchandise."
The court did find that irreparable harm would result from the
continued merchandising of Elvis memorabilia in connection with
"The Big El Show" and enjoined its distribution."
E. Summary
From the foregoing cases it is apparent that the sale of mer-
chandise bearing a deceased celebrity's name and likeness may be
enjoined in New York,1 " New Jersey, 101 and Georgia.102 It is also
clear that the opportunity to commercially exploit a decedent's right
of publicity exists in California, where it can be restricted, if at all,
only as to those products the celebrity exploited during life.1 03 Thus,
in California if a deceased celebrity had, during life, marketed tee-
shirts bearing his name and likeness, members of the general public
would be prohibited from doing so. However, as to opportunities the
celebrity had left unexploited, such as marketing a coffee mug bear-
ing the celebrity's name and likeness, any member of the general
public would be free to exploit that opportunity with impunity.
The status of the posthumous right of publicity is less certain in
Tennessee. It is possible that Tennessee is more liberal than Califor-
nia and does not recognize a posthumous right of publicity, whether
or not the publicity right was exploited during life. Or, Tennessee
may follow New York and recognize the right posthumously without
regard to lifetime exploitation. 1"
The status of the posthumous right of publicity in other juris-
dictions can only be determined when the appropriate cases present
themselves. Undoubtedly jurisdictions will continue the current trend
of following either the California or New York rule. Because public-
97. 513 F. Supp. at 1379.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1379.80.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 71-98.
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ity rights are exploited across state lines, the need for national legis-
lation to resolve the issue is imperatise.105
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION OR NON-
RECOGNITION OF THE POSTHUMOUS RIGHT OF PUBLICITY.
A number of policy considerations have been advanced in sup-
port of the posthumous right of publicity. Most significant are that
recognition of a posthumous right of publicity encourages creativity,
and that lifetime assignment of the right assures its survival in the
celebrity's heirs. Both policies and their related issues will be
discussed.
A. Encouraging Creativity
The notion that creativity should be rewarded economically has
been repeatedly voiced by commentators and the courts. In Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting,10 6 the United States Supreme
Court was particularly concerned with the celebrity's ability to earn
a living from an act that was the product of his talent, time and
energy.10 7
It is plausible to contend that if a living person is not given
statutory or common law protection he will not continue to be crea-
tive. The likelihood that any celebrity, whether he be an artist, musi-
cian, writer, actor, or filmmaker, would continue to be creative in his
particular field were he not able to reap the economic benefits of his
work is extremely doubtful. A living person, however, can easily
protect his right through copyright law 08 and licensing agreements
which cover the product of his creative endeavors.
To contend that a posthumous right of publicity actually en-
courages creativity is much less compelling. The Georgia Supreme
Court, in Martin Luther-King, Jr. Center for Social Change v.
American Heritage Products,'00 reasoned that a posthumous right of
publicity does encourage creativity. In King the court stated that if
the right of publicity did not survive the celebrity, it would be dimin-
ished during life because the celebrity's untimely death would impair
105. See infra section V.
106. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
107. Id. at 575.
108. A discussion of copyright law is beyond the scope of this comment. For a copyright
analysis as it affects the posthumous right of publicity, see Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 85.
109. 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
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or destroy "the value of the right of continued commercial use."'
Because fame and notoriety are so fleeting, however, it is virtu-
ally impossible to gauge the value of any celebrity's right of publicity
if he were to die suddenly. Celebrities exploit their talents in the free
market by means of contracts and licensing agreements. A celebrity's
"publicity value" can be calculated using numerous methods. For
example, a percentage or a flat fee payment on the sale of merchan-
dise such as books, tee-shirts, and movie tickets, payment of a fee
similar to that which like celebrities are paid for like effort, or a
profit-sharing agreement are methods by which commercial exploita-
tion may be valued.
The possibility that the person might suffer an untimely death
does not necessarily diminish the publicity value during life, for the
"value" is derived from sales of the celebrity's "creativity" in the
form of merchandise. The revenues from such merchandise fluctuate
with public demand. In fact, untimely death may even increase the
demand for the celebrity's merchandise.11 Thus, giving a person's
heirs posthumous control over his publicity rights will not encourage
his personal creativity and effort during life.1 1
B. Lifetime Assignment.
The requirement of making a lifetime assignment of publicity
rights as a means of assuring survival of the right in the celebrity's
heirs has been examined, at least in dicta, in most of the cases con-
sidered herein.113 There are four lifetime assignment models. In
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, lifetime assignment is completely unnec-
essary: failure to exercise one's publicity right during life in order to
protect it from use by others does not preclude the celebrity's heirs
from inheriting the famous ancestor's publicity right." 4
110. 296 S.E.2d at 705.
111. In Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (1981), the court stated, "it is
even possible that defendant's production [of an impersonation of an Elvis Presley concert after
the entertainer's death] has stimulated the public's interest in buying Elvis Presley merchan-
dise or in seeing films or hearing records embodying actual Elvis Presley performances." Id. at
1379.
112. For further discussion of posthumous right of publicity as encouraging creativity
see, Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88
YALE L.J. 1577, 1618-19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubin I].
113. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979);
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (1981).
114. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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The second model is illustrated by Factors L "' There, an inter
vivos assignment of the celebrity's publicity right guarantees that the
assignee owns the exclusive right to the celebrity's name and likeness
after his death. The court in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures articulated
model three: lifetime assignment of the right of publicity in connec-
tion with a particular product or service insures survival of the right
of publicity as to that product or service."" The most radical model
appears in Memphis Development v. Factors, Etc., Inc., where the
court held that lifetime assignment is irrelevant, and that a dece-
dent's name and likeness is an economic opportunity available to all
in a free market system.11 7
All of these models present problems. The Price scheme, in
which no assignment is necessary, leads to the conclusion that even if
a publicity right remains unexploited for many generations, ex-
tremely remote descendents having no interest in selling tee-shirts
bearing the likeness of the ancestor would, nonetheless, be able to
stop an enterprising business person from doing so. As an example,
should the heirs of Emily Dickinson be able to enjoin the sale of so-
called "literary tee-shirts" bearing her name and likeness? Should
Paul Revere's heirs be able to enjoin the sale of pots and pans mar-
keted as Revere Ware?
The Factors I model, in which lifetime assignment guarantees
posthumous survival, raises the issue of whether a person can exploit
his heretofore unused publicity right simply by making an assign-
ment or a devise by will. The possibility exists that a celebrity who
has never exploited himself through products such as posters or tee-
shirts may make a "wholesale" assignment or devise of "all my
rights of publicity." However, the assignee may choose to not enter
into a commercial venture during the celebrity's life, calculating, per-
haps, that the right will be more valuable after the celebrity's death.
Is the mere assignment or devise sufficient "exploitation" to insure
survival of a name and likeness that has never been merchandised?
Surely an entrepreneur who would seek to market a tee-shirt or
poster using the celebrity's name and likeness would argue that mere
assignment or devise by will is insufficient commercial exploitation.
The Lugosi model, in which lifetime assignment may assure
posthumous survival as to a particular product or service, though the
least objectionable model, is subject to two interpretations. It is possi-
115. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
116. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
117. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
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ble that the lifetime exploitation of a celebrity's name and likeness
on a product or service would prevent anyone, other than the as-
signee, from commercially exploiting that product or service posthu-
mously. It is also possible that the assignment can be made only as to
a particular likeness. Thus, if the celebrity assigns the likeness in a
particular photograph to a licensee who will market the likeness on a
tee-shirt, that assignment would not prevent a third party from using
any other photographic likeness of the celebrity in a tee-shirt
business.
Lugosi also raises the issue of the disposition of a likeness with
a secondary meaning. 118 A secondary meaning arises when an indi-
vidual becomes so closely associated with a character or product that
the two become indistinguishable. Thus, Lugosi as Count Dracula
has a secondary meaning that belongs to Universal Pictures by con-
tractual agreement. 19 If a likeness has a secondary meaning, does
this prohibit both the heirs and third parties from profiting from its
exploitation? For example, could Mark Hamill's heirs market a tee-
shirt using a photograph of the actor in his Luke Skywalker make-
up and costume, or does such a likeness have a secondary meaning
making it the exclusive property or "right of value" of Twentieth
Century-Fox and Lucasfilm?
Lifetime assignment also fails to address such issues as what
kind of product may be the subject of commercial exploitation, and
when an injunction against exploitation will conflict with the first
amendment.1 ' Is it permissible to realize profit by naming pots and
pans "Revere Ware," an insurance company "John Hancock,.' a
utility "Consolidated Edison," and a pastry "Napoleon, 121 or does
assignment cover only posters, tee-shirts, mugs, and memorabilia?
From Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 2 Hicks v. Casablanca
Records,1" 8 Estate of Presley v. Russen'24 and Groucho Marx Pro-
ductions v. Day and Night Co.,121 it may be concluded that the sale
of books and movies, and impersonations of a famous ancestor cannot
be prevented by heirs who claim posthumous infringement of the
118. 25 Cal. 3d at 818, 823, 603 P.2d at 428, 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 328.
119. Id. at 816 n.2, 603 P.2d at 426 n.2, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 324 n.2.
120. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Consideration of first amendment
issues are beyond the scope of this comment. For an analysis of the right of publicity and the
first amendment, see Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 112.
121. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
122. 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980).
123. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
124. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
125. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ancestor's right of publicty. Yet, despite the fact that freedom of ex-
pression is protected by the first amendment, movies, books and per-
formances featuring impersonations are profit-making ventures
which deprive heirs and assigns of economic benefit to the same de-
gree as do tee-shirts and posters.
Thus, neither the encouragement of creative endeavors nor a
lifetime assignment of publicity rights are sound reasons to recognize
a posthumous right of publicity.
V. THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT.
A. The Problem
Whether exploited by the celebrity himself during life or by his
heirs and assigns after death, the mass media is the primary means
by which a celebrity's right of publicity is exploited. The market for
"celebrity merchandise" is national in scope. 26 Because "celebrity
merchandise" is sold across state lines, the jurisdictional conflict is
highly significant.
When a merchandiser is enjoined from selling his product in
New York, there is nothing to prevent commercial exploitation of
that same product in California. Though the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution 2 7 mandates that a Califor-
nia court honor a money judgment obtained against the merchan-
diser in New York, California does not recognize a cause of action
for infringement of posthumous right of publicity. Thus, the mer-
chandiser who was enjoined in New York may operate a tee-shirt
business in California without fear of liability.
Two examples are illustrative of the need for national legisla-
tion regarding the posthumous right of publicity. A merchandiser
domiciled in Georgia starts a business selling tee-shirts on which is
imprinted the name and likeness of Clark Gable. He advertises the
tee-shirts in national editions of Time and Newsweek. Gable's heirs
bring suit in Georgia asserting posthumous infringement of Gable's
right of publicity. Despite the fact that Gable never made an assign-
ment during life, they are successful because Georgia recognizes the
cause of action without reference to lifetime exploitation. The mer-
chandiser pays the money damages that are assessed and ceases do-
126. Over $60 billion is spent each year on advertising for radio, television, newspaper,
magazines and direct mail. More than half of this sum buys national advertisements. STATS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 566 (103d ed. 1982, 1983).
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
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ing business in Georgia. Two months later the merchandiser incor-
porates a Clark Gable tee-shirt business in California and advertises
through the same national media. The merchandiser is engaged in a
lawful business in California and Gable's heirs are powerless to stop
his profit-making endeavors.
Another scenario involves the production of a Broadway play
satirizing the life of a famous, deceased celebrity. The celebrity's
heirs bring suit in New York against the producers, who refuse to
pay the heirs a royalty fee, alleging infringement of celebrity's pos-
thumous publicity rights. The heirs prevail in court. The producers,
however, form a road company of the show and exhibit the produc-
tion in California. Again, the heirs are powerless to prevent commer-
cial exploitation of the play because California does not recognize a
posthumous infringement action.
These two examples demonstrate the need for a uniform law.
Without a uniform act, exhibitors and merchandisers will be forced
to place advertisements for their products only in editions of the na-
tional media that circulate or are broadcast in those states which do
not recognize a posthumous right of publicity. Without national leg-
islation, producers and merchandisers will be subject to suit in each
state in which they do business where the courts have not yet spoken,
to determine whether they can continue business in those states.
Without a uniform act, efficient interstate commerce is ham-
pered and may, in some cases, be completely inhibited because mer-
chandisers and producers may be unwilling to enter a commercial
venture using a deceased celebrity's name and likeness due to the
threat of legal action and the attendant difficulties of state by state,
rather than national business planning.
B. The Solution
The court suggested in Memphis Development v. Factors Etc.,
Inc. that there should be an "equal distribution of the opportunity"
to exploit a deceased celebrity's right of publicity. 28 The adoption of
a uniform national act, though not as expansive as Judge Merritt's
proposal, would offer protection for merchandisers without depriving
the heirs of a valid assignment of rights.
The proposed statute should be adopted as the second para-
graph of section 652C of the Restatement of Torts. The proposed
wording is set forth herein:
128. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
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The right of publicity is a personal right which does not survive
the death of the owner. The right may be assigned or devised
inter vivos by evidence of significant commercial exploitation.
Such assignment or devise is effective posthumously and may be
enforced only by the immediate heirs or assigns solely to the
extent of the particular likeness assigned. The right of publicity
may not be assigned or devised by means of a grant in all rights
to every likeness.
The proposed legislation states that the right of publicity is a
personal right which does not descend unless there has been a life-
time assignment to an assignee who has commercially exploited the
right. To permit otherwise would encourage waiting for the celebrity
to die before commercial exploitation takes place. The statute places
the right in immediate heirs or assigns, thereby preventing remote
heirs or assigns from enjoining a business that uses the name and
likeness of a celebrity whose publicity right would ordinarily be in
the public domain. Lastly, the legislation is designed to vest in the
heirs or assigns only the particular likeness of the celebrity ancestor
that was exploited during life, and to prevent the "wholesale" devise
of "all my rights of publicity to all my likenesses in all products."
This last feature is particularly significant because it allows mer-
chandisers to market a tee-shirt or poster bearing a celebrity's name
and likeness, even though his heirs and assigns are also doing so, so
long as the likeness used by the merchandiser is not the subject of the
assignment made by the celebrity.
VI. CONCLUSION
As each suit alleging infringement of an ancestor's right of pub-
licity is brought, courts will be forced to choose between the Califor-
nia rule, which does not recognize the right, and the New York rule,
which does. Thus, the jurisdictional split will continue. As a result, a
merchandiser who seeks to market a deceased celebrity's likeness on
a tee-shirt will be free to do so in some states, prohibited in others,
and permitted to do so in yet another group of states only if a partic-
ular inter vivos assignment was made. The jurisdictional split will be
exacerbated when each jurisiction that recognized a posthumous
publicity right chooses a different inter vivos assignment model.
Adoption of the proposed uniform act will promote efficient use
of interstate commerce to exploit posthumous publicity rights. The
proposed act does not recognize a posthumous right of publicity.
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However, it provides protection for merchandisers without depriving
the heirs of a valid assignment of rights.
Leslie Kane
